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Winning the Caucus Race: Continuous Leader Election via Public Randomness
Sarah Azouvi, Patrick McCorry and Sarah Meiklejohn
University College London, United Kingdom
There was no ‘One, two, three, and away,’ but they began
running when they liked, and left off when they liked, so
that it was not easy to know when the race was over.
—Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale
Abstract—Consensus protocols inherently rely on the notion of
leader election, in which one or a subset of participants are
temporarily elected to authorize and announce the network’s
latest state. While leader election is a well studied problem, the
rise of distributed ledgers (i.e., blockchains) has led to a new
perspective on how to perform large-scale leader elections via
solving a computationally difficult puzzle (i.e., proof of work).
In this paper, we present Caucus, a large-scale leader election
protocol with minimal coordination costs that does not require
the computational cost of proof-of-work. We evaluate Caucus
in terms of its security, using a new model for blockchain-
focused leader election, before testing an implementation of
Caucus on an Ethereum private network. Our experiments
highlight that one variant of Caucus costs only $0.10 per leader
election if deployed on Ethereum.
1. Introduction
One of the central components of any distributed system
is a consensus protocol, by which the system’s participants
can agree on its current state and use that information to
take various actions; e.g., decide whether or not to accept
a certain transaction as valid. At heart, many consensus
protocols rely on a leader election protocol, in which one
participant or subset of participants is chosen to lead these
types of decisions for a single round (or set period of time).
To elect a leader, participants must coordinate amongst
themselves by exchanging several rounds of messages.
In settings such as those exemplified by distributed
ledgers—and in particular by open blockchains such as Bit-
coin— it is not clear how one could adopt traditional leader
election protocols, as the desired level of decentralization
amongst participants makes them appear inappropriate. As a
result, the consensus protocol most often used in this setting
is proof-of-work (PoW), which in some sense replaces the
coordination costs of traditional protocols with the high
computational cost of finding the partial pre-image of a hash,
or solving some other cryptographic puzzle. Even in this
seemingly leaderless consensus protocol, however, there is
still an implicit notion of leadership, as the first participant
to solve the puzzle effectively wins the authority to decide
which transactions are accepted into the blockchain.
One natural area to explore in the setting of distributed
ledgers is therefore the extent to which a compromise can
be made between the coordination costs of traditional leader
election protocols and the computational costs of PoW-based
protocols, and indeed in recent years this has been an active
area of research [24], [22], [14], [19], [6], [17], [35]. While
some protocols attempt this compromise by inserting more
traditional trust models and consensus protocols into the
decentralized setting, others attempt to remove the computa-
tional cost of PoW without requiring any coordination costs.
Instead, these consensus protocols replace the (explicit)
investment of computational cost in PoW-based mining with
some (implicit) represented investment in the health of the
system on behalf of participants. As such, they are often
referred to as proof-of-stake (PoS).
Given the lack of explicit computational cost, PoS-based
protocols are subject to new types of attacks, and therefore
careful and detailed analysis of both their leader election
protocols—which, in contrast to PoW, must be made ex-
plicit—and their incentive mechanisms. While previous
papers on PoS often try to solve both of these problems
at once, in this paper we focus solely on the question of
leader election. By addressing just this well defined question
(‘how to securely agree on a leader without having to
coordinate?’), we are able to model, analyze, and evaluate
our proposed leader election protocol in a more rigorous
manner than would be possible if trying to present a full
PoS solution. We leave the incentives design for future work
that requires a paper on its own.
With this in mind, we begin in Section 4 with a model for
leader election protocols that is inspired by existing models
for coin-tossing protocols but takes into account the unique
requirements of a blockchain-based setting. In particular, we
consider (1) liveness, which is an essential requirement for
any distributed protocol; (2) fairness, as blockchains often
rely on explicit incentives in the form of a reward when
elected leader, so it is important to consider how often this
happens and if it can be biased; and (3) different flavors of
unpredictability, as if an adversary could predict either their
own eligibility or that of another participant then it could
launch attacks accordingly (in particular a grinding or a DoS
attack, respectively).
Next, in Section 5 we present Caucus, our leader election
protocol. Briefly, Caucus works by combining a source of
private randomness (used to hide one’s eligibility from other
participants until it is appropriate to reveal it) with a source
of public randomness (used to guarantee fairness). To create
the public randomness, we begin by looking to existing
protocols for random beacons [34], [19], [11]. To create the
private randomness, we simply allow each participant to do
so themselves, and then ask them to publicly commit to it
by revealing the head of a hash chain.
Our experiments in Section 6 highlight that even the
cheapest random beacon we could find, SCRAPE [11],
costs over $270 to generate in an on-chain Ethereum-based
implementation, whereas a hybrid version that moves some
computation off-chain costs under $80. This motivated us
to create a random beacon inspired by RanDAO [9], that
combines both public and private sources of randomness.
This new solution relies on a somewhat stronger trust as-
sumption (that at least one honest participant has contributed
to the beacon) but costs only $0.10 per leader election. We
also discuss in Section 7 how a leader election protocol like
Caucus could be used to bootstrap from a PoW- to a PoS-
based consensus protocol, although again we leave a detailed
analysis of this problem and our solution as important future
work, that requires an incentives model and analysis.
In summary, our paper makes the following concrete
contributions:
• We present the first model for leader election that is
designed to capture the specific security requirements
associated with blockchains;
• We present a leader election protocol that, in addition to
satisfying more traditional notions of security, ensures
that leaders cannot be subject to DoS attacks because
their eligibility is revealed ahead of time; and
• We present Ethereum-based implementations of both
our leader election protocol and its underlying random
beacon that are cheap enough to be deployed today.
2. Related Work
The work that most closely resemble ours spans from
leader election protocols in the distributed computing liter-
ature to more recent proof-of-stake proposals in the cryp-
tography literature.
In the distributed systems literature, the leader election
problem consists of picking one player (or processor) out of
n, considering that a fraction b of them are bad (faulty or
malicious). Most of the proposed solutions work in the full
information model [4], where parties are computationally
unbounded and every communication is broadcast. The first
leader election protocol is due to Saks [31], who proposed a
baton-passing algorithm resilient to a Θ(n/ log(n)) thresh-
old of bad players. Since then, various protocols have im-
proved on either the communication complexity or fraction
of malicious players [3], [26], [30], [16], [21].
In the cryptography literature, a number of recent pa-
pers have proposed proof-of-stake protocols [19], [6], [17].
Briefly, some of the techniques are similar, but many of
the proposals either rely solely on a source of global ran-
domness (meaning they do not achieve as strong a notion
of unpredictability), or do not use any global randomness
(meaning they do not achieve as strong a notion of fairness).
In the Snow White proof-of-stake protocol [6], the source of
randomness is taken as some nonce in a previous block in
the blockchain, and the leader is then any participant with
public key pk such that H(nonce‖pk‖t) < target (where t
is some agreed-upon time). To ensure that all participants
agree on the value of nonce it must be sufficiently far back
in the blockchain (in case of forks), which means the pro-
tocol does not satisfy any strong notion of unpredictability.
Furthermore, nonce is chosen by the participant who created
this previous block, so as this value could have been biased
by them it is also not possible to prove fairness.
The other main proposed protocol that does not explic-
itly rely on randomness generation is Algorand [17], whose
solution in many ways resembles the RanDAO-inspired
approach we describe in Section 5.3. In this protocol, a value
Q0 is initialized randomly, and then for every round rnd, a
new value is defined as Qrnd ← H(SIGlr (Qrnd−1)‖rnd),
where SIGlr is a deterministic signature under the leader
of round rnd. Algorand does not specify, however, how Q0
could be initialized, saying just that it is “a random number,
part of the system description, and thus publicly known.”
This leaves open the possibility that whoever has set it
may have again run a grinding attack to bias the protocol
(even if doing so would be very computationally expensive).
Again then, it is not clear how to prove fairness under the
assumption that participants wouldn’t act to bias the protocol
in their own favor (which seems economically rational). An-
other similar solution is presented in Ouroboros Praos [15].
In this protocol, a random nonce is also initialized and
then updated using a hash function applied to a Verifiable
Random Function (VRF) using values from previous blocks.
However their beacon can be manipulated by the adversary
as a number of “resets” can be performed and thus it does
not satisfy our security guarantees neither. To the best of our
knowledge then, Caucus is the first implemented solution to
achieve all security guarantees.
Finally, a related notion to the idea of leader election
is that of generating public shared randomness [8], [34],
[11]. While most existing protocols do not scale to hun-
dreds or thousands of participants, recent work such as
RandHound [34] (and its related RandShare and RandHerd
protocols) work to achieve this goal. In Appendix A, we
present the SCRAPE protocol [11], due to Cascudo and
David, that we incorporate into Caucus as a way to initialize
a random beacon.
3. Background Definitions and Notation
In this section, we present the underlying notation and
cryptographic primitives we rely on in the rest of the paper.
In particular, we begin with notation (Section 3.1), and
then present definitions of hash functions (Section 3.2), and
coin tossing (Section 3.3). We end with an overview of
blockchains (Section 3.4), and in particular give definitions
of proof-of-stake and some specific notation associated with
the Ethereum platform.
3.1. Preliminaries
If x is a binary string then |x| denotes its bit length. If
S is a finite set then |S| denotes its size and x
$
←− S denotes
sampling a member uniformly from S and assigning it to
x. λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter and 1λ denotes its
unary representation.
Algorithms are randomized unless explicitly noted oth-
erwise. “PT” stands for “polynomial time.” By y ←
A(x1, . . . , xn;R) we denote running algorithm A on inputs
x1, . . . , xn and random coins R and assigning its output to
y. By y
$
←− A(x1, . . . , xn) we denote y ← A(x1, . . . , xn;R)
for R sampled uniformly at random. By [A(x1, . . . , xn)]
we denote the set of values that have non-zero probabil-
ity of being output by A on inputs x1, . . . , xn. Adver-
saries are algorithms. We denote non-interactive algorithms
using the font Alg, and denote interactive protocols us-
ing the font Prot. We further denote such protocols as
outputs
$
←− Prot(1λ,P , inputs), where the i-th entry of
inputs (respectively, outputs) is used to denote the input
to (respectively, output of) the i-th participant.
We say that two probability ensembles X and Y are
statistically close over a domain D if 12
∑
α∈D |Pr[X = α]−
Pr[Y = α]| is negligible; we denote this as X ≈ Y .
3.2. Hash functions
A hash function is a functionH : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓ; i.e.,
a function that maps strings of arbitrary length to strings of
some fixed length ℓ. When a hash function is modeled as a
random oracle, this means that computing H(x) is modeled
as (1) looking up x in some global map and using the value
of H(x) if it has been set already, and (2) if not, picking
a random value y
$
←− {0, 1}ℓ and setting H(x) ← y in the
map.
There are many desired properties of hash functions that
trivially hold when they are modeled as random oracles. Of
these, the two we are particularly interested in unpredictabil-
ity and secrecy [10]. These are defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. [10] A hash function satisfies unpredictabil-
ity if no PT adversary can find an x such that (x,H(x)) has
some desired property. More formally, let Ix be an oracle
that, on queries z, returns whether or not z = x. Then
for all x, predicates P (·), and PT adversaries A that have
access to H(·), there exists an algorithm A′ that has access
only to Ix such that A
′ has roughly the same advantage in
predicting P (x) as does A.
Definition 3.2. [10] A hash function satisfies secrecy if,
given H(x), no PT adversary with binary output can infer
any information about x. Formally, for a domain D and for
all x, y ∈ D,
〈x,A(H(x))〉 ≈ 〈x,A(H(y))〉.
3.3. Coin tossing and random beacons
Coin tossing is closely related to leader election [4], and
allows two or more parties to agree on a single or many
random bits [7], [5], [28]; i.e., to output a value R that is
statistically close to random.
A coin-tossing protocol must satisfy liveness, unpre-
dictability, and unbiasability [34], where we define these (in
keeping with our definitions for leader election in Section 4)
as follows:
Definition 3.3. Let fa be the fraction of participants con-
trolled by an adversary A. Then a coin-tossing protocol
satisfies fa-liveness if it is still possible to agree on a
random value R even in the face of such an A.
Definition 3.4. A coin-tossing protocol satisfies unpre-
dictability if, prior to some step barrier in the protocol, no
PT adversary can produce better than a random guess at
the value of R.
Definition 3.5. A coin-tossing protocol is fa-unbiasable
if for all PT adversaries A controlling an fa fraction of
participants, the output R is still statistically close to a
uniformly distributed random string.
Many coin-tossing protocols [7], [28] follow a structure
called commit-then-reveal: to start, in the commit phase each
participant creates and broadcasts a cryptographic commit-
ment [18] to a random value. In the reveal phase, participants
broadcasts the opening of their commitments, and can use
the opening to check the validity of the initial commitment.
The output value is then some combination (e.g., XOR)
of all the individual random values. Intuitively, while this
basic solution does not satisfy liveness, it satisfies unpre-
dictability due to the hiding property of the commitment
scheme (where barrier corresponds to the step in which the
last commitment is opened), and unbiasability due to the
binding property. In order to achieve liveness, secret sharing
can be used. To ensure that the protocol produces a valid
output, participants create shares of their secret and send
these shares to other participants during the commit phase.
This allows participants to recover the value of another
participant even if they abort.
A closely related concept to coin tossing is random bea-
cons. These were first introduced by Rabin [29] as a service
for “emitting at regularly spaced time intervals, randomly
chosen integers”. To extend the above definitions to random
beacons, as inspired by [8], we require that the properties of
fa-liveness and fa-unbiasability apply for each iteration of
the beacon, or round. We also require that the barrier in the
unpredictability definition is at least the begining of each
round. We present such a scheme, SCRAPE [11], in more
detail in Appendix A.
3.4. Blockchain basics
Distributed ledgers, or blockchains, have become in-
creasingly popular ever since Bitcoin was first proposed by
Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [25]. Briefly, individual Bitcoin
users wishing to pay other users broadcast transactions to
a global peer-to-peer network, and the peers responsible
for participating in Bitcoin’s consensus protocol (i.e., for
deciding on a canonical ordering of transactions) are known
as miners. In order to participate, miners form blocks, which
contain (among other things that we ignore for ease of
exposition) the transactions collected since the previous
block was mined, which we denote txset, a pointer to the
previous block hash hprev, and a proof-of-work (PoW). This
PoW is the solution to a computational puzzle specified
by a value target; roughly, it is a value nonce such that
H(nonce‖txset‖hprev) < target, and indicates that the miner
has put in the computational effort (or work) necessary to
find nonce. Every other peer in the network can verify the
validity of a block, and if future miners choose to include
it by incorporating its hash into their own PoW then it
becomes part of the global blockchain. In the rare case where
two miners find a block at the same time, other miners
decide which block to mine off of. Bitcoin follows the
longest chain rule, meaning that whichever fork creates the
longest chain is the one that is considered valid. The block
that hasn’t been included in that fork is thus abandoned.
3.4.1. Proof-of-stake. By its nature, PoW consumes a lot
of energy. Thus, some alternative consensus protocols have
been proposed that are more cost-effective; as of this writ-
ing, arguably the most popular of these is called proof-
of-stake (PoS) [1], [20], [2], [35]. If we consider PoW
to be a leader election protocol in which the leader (i.e.,
the miner with the valid block) is selected in proportion
to their amount of computational power, then PoS can be
seen as a leader election protocol in which the leader (i.e.,
the participant who is eligible to propose a new block) is
selected in proportion to some “stake” they have in the
system. This can be represented as the amount of coins they
have (either in some form of escrow or just in total), or the
age of their coins.
As security no longer stems from the fact that it is
expensive to create a block, PoS poses several technical
challenges [12]. The main three are as follows: first, the
nothing at stake problem says that have no reason to not
mine on top of every chain, since mining is costless, so
it is more difficult to reach consensus. This is an issue of
incentives, so given our focus on leader election we consider
it out of scope for this paper.
Second, PoS allows for grinding attacks, in which once
a miner is elected leader they privately iterate through many
valid blocks (again, because mining is costless) in an attempt
to find one that may give them an unfair advantage in the
future (e.g., make them more likely to be elected leader).
This is an issue that we encounter in Section 5 and address
using a public source of randomness.
Finally, in a long range attack, an attacker may bribe
miners into selling their old private keys, which would allow
them to re-write the entire history of the blockchain. Again,
this is an issue of incentives that we consider out of the
scope of this paper.
3.4.2. Smart contracts and Ethereum. Bitcoin’s scripting
language is intentionally limited, and intended to support
mainly the transfer of coins from one set of parties to
another. In contrast, the Ethereum platform provides a more
complex scripting language that allows it to act as a sort of
distributed virtual machine, and to support more complex
objects called smart contracts.
Ethereum transactions contain a destination address to
(that can specify either the location of a stateful smart
contract, or just a regular user-owned address), an amount
amt to be sent (denominated in ether), an optional data
field data, a gas limit, and a signature σ authorizing the
transaction with respect to the sender’s keypair (pk, sk) (just
as in Bitcoin). We ignore everything except the data field
in our protocol specifications below and in Section 5, but
mention briefly here that gas is a subcurrency in Ethereum
used to pay for the computational operations performed
by a smart contract. We denote the process of creating
a transaction as (again, ignoring all but the data field)
tx
$
←− FormTx(sk, data), and the process of verifying a
transaction as 0/1← VerifyTx(tx).
4. A Model for Leader Election
Most of the consensus protocols in the distributed sys-
tems literature are leader-based, as it is the most optimal
solution in term of coordination [27]. Perhaps as a result,
leader election has in general been very well studied within
the distributed systems community [31], [30], [16], [26],
[21].
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge the problem
of leader election has not been given an extensive cryp-
tographic or security-focused treatment, so in this section
we provide a threat model in which we consider a variety
of adversarial behavior. This is particularly crucial in open
applications like consensus protocols for blockchains, as any
actor can participate in the consensus protocol, so we cannot
place any trust in the set of potential leaders or assume
any built-in Sybil resistance. While this is our motivating
application, we consider this type of leader election to be
useful in any application in which some limited set of
untrusted participants should be eligible to take some action.
4.1. The setting
We consider a round-based leader election protocol run
between a set of participants P ; that is, a protocol in which
the participants want to agree on who is eligible to take some
action (e.g., propose a new block) in some future round rnd.
Each participant maintains some private state statepriv,
and all participants are expected to agree on some public
state statepub. For ease of exposition, we assume each
statepriv includes the public state statepub. We refer to a
message sent by a participant as a transaction, denoted
tx, where this transaction can either be broadcast to other
participants (as in a more classical consensus protocol) or
committed to a public blockchain.
Our model is inspired by the classical approach of
coin-tossing protocols that proceed in a commit-then-reveal
fashion. It consists of four algorithms and one interactive
protocol, which behave as follows:
statepub
$
←− Setup(1λ) is used to establish the initial public
state statepub.
(statepriv, txcom)
$
←− Commit(statepub, rndmax) is used by a
participant to commit themselves to participating in the
leader election up to some round rndmax. This involves
establishing both an initial private state statepriv and a
public announcement txcom.
{state
(i)
priv}i
$
←− Update(1λ,P , {(rnd, state
(i)
priv)}i) is run
amongst the committed participants, each of whom is
given rnd and their own private state state
(i)
priv, in order
to update both the public state statepub and their own
private states to prepare the leader election for round
rnd.
txrev
$
←− Reveal(rnd, statepriv) is used by a participant to
broadcast a proof of their eligibility txrev for round rnd
(or ⊥ if they are not eligible).
0/1← Verify(rnd, statepub, txrev) is used by a participant to
verify a claim txrev of eligibility for round rnd.
4.2. Security properties
We would like a leader election protocol to achieve three
security properties: liveness, unpredictability, and fairness.
The first property map to the established property of liveness
for classical consensus protocols, although as we see below
we consider several different flavors of unpredictability that
are specific to our motivating blockchain-based application.
The final one, fairness (also called chain quality [19]), is
especially important in open protocols like blockchains, in
which participation must be explicitly incentivized rather
than assumed.
We begin by defining liveness, which requires that con-
sensus can be achieved even if some fraction of participants
are malicious or inactive.
Definition 4.1 (Liveness). Let fa be the fraction of partici-
pants controlled by an adversary A. Then a leader election
protocol satisfies fa-liveness if it is still possible to elect a
leader even in the face of such an A; i.e., if for every public
state statepub that has been produced via Update with the
possible participation of A, it is still possible for at least
one participant, in a round rnd, to output a value txrev such
that Verify(rnd, statepub, txrev) = 1.
Next, unpredictability requires that participants cannot
predict which other participants will be elected leader before
some point in time.
Definition 4.2 (Unpredictability). A leader election protocol
satisfies unpredictability if, prior to some step barrier in the
protocol, no PT adversary A can produce better than a
random guess at whether or not a given participant will
be eligible for round rnd. If barrier is the step in which
a participant broadcasts txrev, and we require A to guess
only about the eligibility of honest participants (rather than
participants they control), then we say it satisfies delayed
unpredictability. If it is still difficult for A to guess even
about their own eligibility, we say it satisfies private unpre-
dictability.
Most consensus protocols satisfy only the regular variant
of unpredictability we define, where barrier is the point
at which the Update interaction is “ready” for round rnd
(e.g., the participants have completed a coin-tossing or other
randomness-generating protocol). This typically occurs at
the start of the round, but may also occur several rounds
before it.
If an adversary is aware of the eligibility of other par-
ticipants ahead of time, then it may be able to target these
specific participants for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack,
which makes achieving liveness more difficult. A protocol
that satisfies delayed unpredictability solves this issue, how-
ever, as participants reveal their own eligibility only when
they choose to do so, by which point it may be too late for
the adversary to do anything. (For example, in a proof-of-
stake protocol, if participants include proofs of eligibility
only in the blocks they propose, then by the time the leader
is known the adversary has nothing to gain by targeting them
for a DoS attack.)
A protocol that satisfies private unpredictability, in con-
trast, is able to prevent an adversary from inflating their own
role as a leader. For example, if an adversary can predict
many rounds into the future what their own eligibility will
be, they may attempt to bias the protocol in their favor
by grinding [12] through some problem space in order to
produce an initial commitment txcom that yields good future
results.
Private unpredictability thus helps to guarantee fairness,
which we define as requiring that each committed participant
is selected as leader equally often. While for the sake of
simplicity our definition considers equal weighting of par-
ticipants, it can easily be extended to consider participants
with respect to some other distribution (e.g., in a proof-of-
stake application, participants may be selected as leader in
proportion to their represented “stake” in the system).
Definition 4.3 (Fairness). A leader election protocol is fa-
fair if for all PT adversaries A controlling an fa frac-
tion of participants, the probability that A is selected as
leader is nearly uniform; i.e., for all rnd, statepriv, statepub
(where again statepub has been produced by Update with
the possible participation of A), and txrev created by A,
Pr[Verify(rnd, statepub, txrev) = 1] ≈ fa.
5. Caucus: A Leader Election Protocol
In this section, we present Caucus, a leader election
protocol with minimal coordination that satisfies fairness,
liveness, and strong notions of unpredictability. In Section 6,
we present and evaluate an implementation of Caucus using
the Ethereum blockchain.
To begin, we present a straw-man solution in Section 5.1.
The benefits of this solution are that it in fact requires
no coordination whatsoever; participants are elected leader
based on privately held (but publicly committed to) beliefs
about their own eligibility, which they then reveal to other
participants when relevant. While this means the protocol
achieves liveness and the strong notion of delayed unpre-
dictability, it cannot achieve fairness due to participants’
reliance on their own personal randomness, which they can
bias without significant effort.
To address this shortcoming, in Section 5.2 we discuss
how to fold a source of shared randomness into our protocol
in order to make it fair.
Unfortunately, even the best of these solutions still re-
quires significant coordination, which is prohibitively expen-
sive in a setting in which we want leader election to occur
frequently (e.g., every time a new block is produced). Thus,
in Section 5.3 we explore how to bootstrap the guarantees of
these protocols to extend the randomness in a cheaper way.
Here our techniques are inspired by the RanDAO protocol
described by Buterin [9].
Finally, we put everything together and present in Sec-
tion 5.4 our full solution, Caucus, which combines the
private randomness of our straw-man solution, in order to
achieve delayed unpredictability, with a cheap source of
public randomness, in order to achieve fairness and private
unpredictability.
5.1. A straw-man solution
We begin with a simple straw-man solution in which
participants commit to some privately held randomness by
forming a hash chain; i.e., a list (h1, . . . , hn) such that h1 =
H(s) for some random seed and hi = H(hi−1) for all i,
2 ≤ i ≤ n. We denote by Hi(s) the application of H to s
for i times.
In Setup, the public state is just initialized to be an
empty list; eventually, it will contain a list of commitments
c posted by participants, in the form of the heads of their
hash chains. For this and all of our subsequent solutions,
we assume participants have generated signing keypairs
(pk, sk) and are aware of the public key associated with
each other participant (which can easily be achieved at
the time participants run Commit). We omit the process
of generating keys from our formal descriptions but denote
by tx[i] the participant associated with a given transaction
(which corresponds to the public key used to sign it).
To to be considered as potential leaders, participants
must place a security deposit, that involves creating a
commitment to their randomness. In our implementation
in Section 6, this entails including the commitment in a
transaction that also puts into escrow some monetary value
and sending it to an Ethereum smart contract, but in general
the commitment could just be a message broadcast to all
other participants. This means the Commit function picks
a random seed, forms a hash chain of length rndmax, and
returns the seed itself as the private state of the participant
and the head of the hash chain (incorporated into a trans-
action) as the transaction to add to the public state. More
formally:
Commit(statepub, rndmax)
s
$
←− {0, 1}∗
txcom
$
←− FormTx(sk,H rndmax(s))
return (s, txcom)
The eligibility of each participant to act as leader is then
based purely on the privately held beliefs contained inside
their hash chain. In particular, this solution requires no coor-
dination and thus no Update protocol. Instead, in each round
rnd a participant can check if they are eligible by checking if
H rndmax−rnd(s) < targetrnd for targetrnd = Hmax/nrnd (i.e.,
the maximum hash value divided by the number of potential
leaders in rnd). They can then prove their eligibility by
peeling back to that layer of their hash chain, which means
running Reveal as follows:
Reveal(rnd, statepriv)
hrnd ← H
rndmax−rnd(s)
return txrev ← FormTx(sk, hrnd)
As with Commit, in a more general system this could
involve simply broadcasting the value hrnd itself, rather than
forming it into a transaction.
Finally, once a Reveal transaction has been broadcast,
other participants can verify the eligibility of that participant
by checking that the layer revealed correlates with the
commitment to their hash chain. More formally:
Verify(rnd, c = statepub, txrev)
hrnd ← txrev[data]
i← txrev[i]
return (hrnd < targetrnd) ∧ (H
rnd(hrnd) = c[i])
As stated, participants can join by broadcasting a
Commit transaction at any time after the protocol has
started. To maintain unpredictability, however, participants
should become eligible only after some fixed number of
rounds have passed since they ran Commit. In this case,
Verify would check not only that hrnd < targetrnd, but also
that rndjoined > rnd − x (where rndjoined is the round in
which the participant broadcast txcom and x is the required
number of interim rounds).
Because of its lack of coordination, and as long as the
commitment hides the previous values in the hash chain,
this protocol clearly satisfies delayed unpredictability, as
participants never talk to each other before they reveal their
own eligibility. It also achieves a notion of liveness, as again
participants do not rely on each other to establish their own
eligibility. It could be the case in some round, however, that
no participant is elected leader. In this case, to maintain live-
ness we consider that if after a small delay no participants
have broadcast a txrev transaction, we skip the round and
participants update the value of rnd as rnd← rnd+1. This
ensure that the protocol keeps running and that a participant
will be elected in some future round.
Lemma 5.1. If H is a random oracle, then the protocol de-
scribed above satisfies liveness and delayed unpredictability.
Proof. The protocol satisfies liveness, as no coordination is
required amongst participants. In particular then, any online
participant can communicate their own eligibility to other
online participants and be considered leader. The exception
is if no online participants satisfy the condition that hrnd <
targetrnd, but then we can either skip this round as explained
above, or modify targetrnd to ensure that this never happens.
To satisfy delayed unpredictability, we must show that—
unless it has formed hrnd itself—no adversary A can predict
whether or not hrnd < targetrnd before the point at which
it is given txrev, and thus in particular before it is given
hrnd itself. In the protocol, the adversary sees H
rndmax(s) as
part of the commitment of the relevant honest participant,
and if that participant has run Reveal before it may have
also seen H rndmax−rnd
′
(s) for rnd′ < rnd. In the worst case,
it has seen this for rnd′ = rnd − 1, meaning it has seen
H rndmax−rnd+1(s) = H(hrnd).
If we define x = hrnd, then this is equivalent to giving
H(x) to A and asking it to predict some predicate P (x),
where in this case P (z) = 1 if z < targetrnd and 0
otherwise. By the unpredictability of random oracles (Defi-
nition 3.1), we know that this is not possible.
If we use targetrnd as described above, then in theory
our protocol should also be able to establish fairness if s
is uniformly distributed. Indeed, by setting targetrnd on a
per-participant basis, we could even satisfy more complex
fairness guarantees, such as ensuring that participants who
have put more money into escrow in their security deposit
get chosen as leader more often.
As s is chosen by each participant rather than uniformly
at random, however, we cannot actually guarantee fairness.
In particular, participants can grind through different seeds
in order to find one that unfairly favors them. This is
due partially to the fact that the protocol is not privately
unpredictable with respect to any well defined barrier: once
the adversary has decided on a seed, it can predict its own
eligibility in all future rounds (modulo the shifting number
of participants, which it can either grind through as well, or
wait until the number of participants is established before
grinding).
Lemma 5.2. If H is a random oracle, then the protocol
described above is not fair.
Proof. As H is a random oracle, every element in the hash
chain can be modeled as a random variable uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 2ℓ−1]. For a given seed s, the probability p for
a given rnd that hrnd < targetrnd is thus targetrnd/(2
ℓ − 1).
Define M(s) to be the number of hashes hrnd in a
hash chain of length rndmax where hrnd < targetrnd; i.e.,
M(s) =
∑
hrnd<target
1. M is thus a sum of Bernoulli
random variables, meaning it follows a Binomial distribution
B(rndmax, p). It it possible for the adversary to grind (i.e.,
iterate) through different seeds in order to find one that
performs better.
In particular, an adversary can break fairness as fol-
lows: it tries many different seeds in order to find one
for which M > rndmaxp + ǫ for some ǫ > 0 (with
average(M) = rndmaxp). By the properties of Binomial
distribution, we have that
Pr[M > k] = 1− Pr[M ≤ k]
= 1−
k∑
i=0
(
rndmax
i
)
pi(1− p)rndmax−i.
If we define this last term to be α, then the expectation
on the number of trials needed for the adversary to find such
a seed is 1/α. In each trial, the adversary computes rndmax
hashes, so in total it needs to compute rndmax/α hashes.
5.2. Folding in randomness
Given the limitation of our straw-man solution that ad-
versaries can grind through random seeds, and thus fairness
does not hold, we must consider ways to improve this
guarantee.
We begin by considering other solutions that do not have
randomness, or that rely on some source of randomness
produced without an explicit coin-tossing protocol. First, as
suggested by Buterin [9], we consider using H(i) ⊕ hrnd
rather than just using hrnd. While this improves matters, as
now an adversary controlling several different participants
would have to grind through separate seeds for each of them
(as opposed to finding one good seed and reusing it across
all of them), a grinding attack is still possible so the protocol
is not fair.
In any solution where the source of randomness is purely
private, it seems somewhat impossible to prevent attacks on
fairness, as adversaries can always privately work to bias
their own randomness, whether in the form of privately held
beliefs about their own eligibility or public randomness that
they produce single-handedly. Furthermore, if the source of
randomness were known too far in advance (such as if we
tried to use something likeH(0), which is uniformly random
if we model H(·) as a random oracle), then the value would
be known too far ahead of time to achieve unpredictability,
in which—as we see in the proof of Theorem 5.3—par-
ticipants must commit before knowing the randomness in a
given round.
To obtain meaningful notions of fairness and unpre-
dictability, it thus seems necessary to incorporate a source of
public, globally sourced randomness. To augment our straw-
man solution using such randomness, we first consider an in-
teractive protocol Update that acts to establish some shared
randomness Rrnd for a given round. This randomness would
then be folded into the straw-man solution by requiring not
that hrnd < targetrnd but that H(hrnd ⊕ Rrnd) < targetrnd.
This results in the following changes:
Reveal(rnd, statepriv)
if (H(hrnd ⊕Rrnd) < targetrnd) return FormTx(sk, hrnd)
Verify(rnd, statepub, txrev)
return (H(hrnd ⊕Rrnd) < targetrnd) ∧ (H
rnd(hrnd) = c[i])
In order to maintain liveness, we consider that if no
participant has revealed txrev before some delay, we update
the random beacon as Rrnd ← H(Rrnd). If Update is a
secure random beacon, then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.3. If H is a random oracle and Rrnd was
produced by a random beacon satisfying liveness (Defini-
tion 3.3), unpredictability (Definition 3.4), and unbiasability
(Definition 3.5), then this protocol satisfies liveness, fairness,
delayed unpredictability (i.e., where barrier is the step at
which the elected leader reveals their proof), and private
unpredictability (where barrier is the step at which the
randomness Rrnd is fixed).
Proof. For liveness, a participant is elected if they broadcast
a valid transaction txrev, such that H(hrnd⊕Rrnd) < target.
If Update satisifies liveness then an adversary controlling fa
participants cannot prevent honest participants from agree-
ing on Rrnd. In the case where no participants produce a
value hrnd such that H(hrnd ⊕ Rrnd) < target, we update
the value of Rrnd as described above until one participant
is elected. With a similar argument as in the proof of
Lemma 5.1, the protocol thus achieve liveness.
For fairness, a participant wins if H(hrnd ⊕ Rrnd) <
targetrnd. By the assumption that Rrnd is unpredictable, and
thus unknown at the time an adversary commits to hrnd, the
distribution of the two values is independent. Combining
this with the assumption that Rrnd is unbiasable and thus
uniformly distributed, we can argue that hrnd⊕Rrnd is also
uniformly distributed. This implies that the probability that
the winning condition holds is also uniformly random, as
desired.
The argument for delayed unpredictability is almost
identical to the one in the proof of Lemma 5.1: even when
Rrnd is known, if A has not formed hrnd itself then by the
unpredictability of the random oracle it cannot predict the
value of P (z), where P (z) = 1 if H(z ⊕Rrnd) < targetrnd
and 0 otherwise.
Finally, private unpredictability follows from the unpre-
dictability of Rrnd and from the independence of hrnd and
Rrnd.
To be compatible with our implementation in Section 6,
the concrete random beacon we use is the SCRAPE proto-
col, due to Cascudo and David [11]. For completeness, we
sketch the original protocol and present our modifications
to it in Appendix A. While we chose SCRAPE due to its
low computational complexity and compatibility with public
ledgers, several other protocols would be suitable as well,
such as RandShare or RandHound [34], or the randomness
generation process used in Ouroboros [19]. Indeed, all of
these solutions are similar in that they instantiate a publicly
verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme (also defined in
Appendix A).
5.3. Extending an initial random beacon
While any random beacon protocol provides the nec-
essary security guarantees for Theorem 5.3, all existing
protocols are relatively expensive in terms of both local
computations and, more crucially, coordination costs. This
is not desirable in a setting such as proof-of-stake, in which
leader election must be run frequently and continuously.
To minimize these costs, we therefore consider a sig-
nificantly cheaper solution in which the random value is
initialized using a secure coin-tossing protocol, but is then
extended and updated using an approach inspired by Ran-
DAO [9].
In this protocol, participants place security deposits just
as they did in our straw-man solution, meaning they run
the exact same Commit algorithm, and each commitment is
added to the public list c.
To initialize the random value, participants now run a
coin-tossing protocol to generate a random value R1 (in our
implementation in Section 6 we use SCRAPE, but again any
secure coin-tossing protocol could work).
For each subsequent round, participants then verify
whether or not they are eligible to fold their randomness into
the global value by checking if H(hrnd ⊕ Rrnd) < target,
where hrnd = H
rndmax−rnd(s). If this value holds, then they
reveal their additional randomness by running the same
Reveal algorithm as in our straw-man solution, which others
can verify in the same way as well. If the participant is
deemed to in fact be eligible, then the global randomness is
updated as Rrnd+1 ← Rrnd ⊕ hrnd. In this setting, however,
an adversary that controls fa participants could get lucky,
privately predict that they will be elected leader for a few
rounds, and choose their new seed value accordingly. To
thwart this, we can again make sure participants have to wait
some number of rounds after they committed. This raises the
probability that an honest participants will be elected leader
between the time an adversary commits and the time they
are allowed to participate, thus making the random beacon
truly unpredictable and grinding attacks ineffective.
In a general system, each participant would need to
maintain their own local copy of R and update it ap-
propriately. In a system such as the Ethereum blockchain
(where RanDAO was originally proposed for use), a smart
contract can act to verify the claims of participants and fold
the randomness in by itself. This makes the contract the
authoritative source of randomness, and because it is on the
blockchain it is also globally visible.
Theorem 5.4. If H is a random oracle and R is initialized
using a secure coin-tossing protocol, then for every subse-
quent round this random beacon is also secure; i.e., it satis-
fies liveness (Definition 3.3), unbiasability (Definition 3.5),
and unpredictability (Definition 3.4) for every subsequent
round.
Proof. For liveness, the argument is the same as in the
proof of Lemma 5.1: after initialization, no coordination is
required, so any online participant can communicate their
own eligibility to other online participants, allowing them to
compute the new random value. In the case where no partici-
pant is elected leader after some delay, then we consider that
participants update their random value by Rrnd ← H(Rrnd)
until a leader is elected.
For fairness, we proceed inductively. By assumption,
R is initialized in a fair way, which establishes the base
case. Now, we assume that Rrnd−1 is uniformly distributed,
and would like to show that Rrnd will be as well. By
the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.3, by
the unpredictability of Rrnd and the fact that an adversary
commits to hrnd−1 before rnd − 1, the value of hrnd−1 is
independent of the value of Rrnd−1 and can be considered
as a constant.
If we define a value R, and denote R′ ← R ⊕ hrnd−1,
then we have
Pr[Rrnd = R] = Pr[hrnd−1 ⊕Rrnd−1 = hrnd−1 ⊕R
′]
= Pr[Rrnd−1 = R
′],
which we know to be uniformly random by assumption, thus
for every R′, we have Pr[Rrnd−1 = R
′] ≈ 1/(2ℓ − 1) and
for every value R, Pr[Rrnd = R] ≈ 1/(2
ℓ−1), proving Rrnd
fairness. (Here ℓ denotes the bitlength of R.)
For unpredictability, we must show that, unless the
adversary is itself the next leader, it is hard to learn the
value of Rrnd before it receives txrev. We have Rrnd =
Rrnd−1⊕hrnd−1, where Rrnd−1 is assumed to be known. By
the same argument about the unpredictability of hrnd−1 as in
Lemma 5.1, however, if it belongs to an honest participant
and H is modeled as a random oracle, then the adversary
is unable to predict this value and thus unable to predict
Rrnd.
Even if the initial value was some constant (e.g., 0)
instead of a randomly generated string, we could still argue
that the protocol is fair after the point that the randomness
of at least one honest participant is incorporated into the
beacon. Indeed in this case the value of the beacon would
be updated as Rrnd+1 ← Rrnd ⊕ hrnd where hrnd is random
since it belongs to an honest participant, and independent of
Rrnd, since it was committed to before round rnd, so this new
value is random. This assumption is weakened the longer
the beacon is live, so works especially well in settings such
as we describe in Section 7.2, in which the leader election
protocol is used to bootstrap from one form of consensus
(e.g., PoW) to another (e.g., PoS).
5.4. Our construction: Caucus
Now that we have a cheap source of continuous random-
ness, we combine it with the privately held beliefs in our
straw-man solution in Section 5.1 to give our full solution,
Caucus. The protocol is summarized in Figure 1.
Theorem 5.5. If H is a random oracle and R is initialized
as a uniformly random value, then Caucus is a secure
leader election protocol; i.e., it satisfies liveness, fairness,
delayed unpredictability (i.e., where barrier is the step at
which the elected leader reveals their proof), and private
unpredictability (where barrier is the step at which the
randomness Rrnd is fixed).
Proof. This theorem holds by the security of the compo-
nents of the system, and in particular because the security
of the random beacon (Theorem 5.4) implies that the neces-
sary conditions for the security of the randomized solution
(Theorem 5.3) hold. We thus get all of the same properties as
the solution proven secure in that theorem. In terms of the
fraction fa of malicious participants that we can tolerate,
it is t/n, where t is the threshold of the PVSS scheme
used to initialize the random beacon (see Appendix A for
more details). After the random beacon is initialized, if
implemented in Ethereum our protocol then requires no
further coordination, so can tolerate any fraction. In the
context of proof-of-stake, however, we would still need to
assume an honest majority.
Finally, in addition to the possibility that no participant
“wins” a given round, it is also possible that there will be
two or more winners in a round. In a pure leader election
protocol, we could simply elect all winning participants as
leaders. In a setting such as proof-of-stake, however, being
elected leader comes with a financial reward, and conflicts
may arise if two winners are elected (such as the nothing-at-
stake problem discussed in Section 3.4.1). While we leave
a full exploration of this as future work (as again this issue
does not arise in the abstract context of leader election),
one potential solution (also suggested by Algorand [17])
for electing a single leader is to require all participants to
submit their winning pre-image hrnd before some time trnd,
and then select as the winner the participant whose pre-
image hrnd has the lowest bit value.
6. Implementation and Performance
In this section, we present the implementation of Caucus
as a suite of Ethereum smart contracts, our experience
running the protocol on a private Ethereum test network,1
and the technical difficulties we faced. The main reason for
doing so is to get an idea of the cost of such a protocol.
6.1. Implementation details
We implemented the Caucus protocol as three smart
contracts written in the Solidity language; together, they
are approximately 950-1,000 lines of code.23 The first two
contracts, Dealer and Scrape, implement the SCRAPE
random beacon of Cascudo and David [11] (which we
describe in more depth in Appendix A), and Caucus
implements our full leader election protocol. Furthermore,
there is an optional LocalCrypto4 contract adopted from
[23] that contains the code for creating the zero knowledge
proofs.
To set up Caucus, a single party creates the Caucus
contract (Step 1) that establishes deadlines treg, tcom, tscr
1. Our full smart contract cannot be deployed on the test network as
blocks support only up to 4.7 million gas, whereas the production network
supports 6.7 million gas.
2. https://www.dropbox.com/s/n89xq4ta17a4n0p/Dealer.sol
3. https://www.dropbox.com/s/yde7e5ja55wq1sb/Dealer_voting.sol
4. https://www.dropbox.com/s/ajzgdw7v59ms43k/LocalCrypto.sol
Setup: In the Setup phase, on input the security parameter 1λ, participants initialize the initial public state of the
protocol statepub with an empty list of deposits c.
Commit: To participate up to round rndmax, a participant commits to a seed s by creating a Commit transaction txcom
that contains a hash value H rndmax(s). Each broadcast commitment is added to the list c maintained in statepub,
and that participant is considered eligible to be elected leader after some fixed number of rounds have passed.
Update: Once enough participants are committed, participants run a secure coin-tossing protocol to obtain a random
value R1. They output a new statepub = (c, R1). This interactive protocol is run only for rnd = 1.
Reveal: For rnd > 1, every participant verifies their own eligibility by checking if H(Rrnd ⊕ hrnd) < target, where
hrnd = H
rndmax−rnd(s) and target = Hmax/nrnd. (Here nrnd is the number of eligible participants; i.e., the number
of participants that have committed a sufficient number of rounds before rnd.) The eligible participant, if one
exists, then creates a transaction txrev with their data hrnd and broadcasts it to their peers.
Verify: Upon receiving a transaction txrev, participants extract hrnd from txrev and check whether or notH(Rrnd⊕hrnd) <
target and if hrnd matches the value committed; i.e., if H
rnd(hrnd) = c[i]. If these checks pass, then the public
randomness is updated as Rrnd+1 ← Rrnd ⊕ hrnd and they output 1, and otherwise the public state stays the same
and they output 0.
Figure 1. Our Caucus protocol.
the maximum round time tcaucus, and the required registra-
tion deposit d. Next, Caucus creates the Scrape contract
(Step 2) before beginning the registration phase. Participants
run Commit (Step 3) to deposit d coins, and also indicate
whether or not they want to participate in SCRAPE. Finally,
registration is closed after treg and Scrape creates a new
Dealer contract (Step 4) for each participant that indicated
interest. All dealers are set as participants in other dealer
contracts (Step 5) before Scrape transitions to the commit
phase and all Dealer contracts transition to the distribution
phase (Step 6).
To now initialize the random beacon using SCRAPE,
each dealer runs the secret sharing phase of SCRAPE and
publishes the resulting encrypted shares and discrete log
equality proofs (DLEQ) to the contract, which it then pro-
cesses (Step 7). In our fully on-chain variant of Caucus, the
Dealer contract also runs all necessary verifications before
storing both the committed and encrypted shares (Step 8a).
Because this type of on-chain verification is financially
expensive (as it requires the contract to execute complex
operations with high gas costs), we also consider a voting-
based variant that adopts the techniques of RandShare [34]
to reduce on-chain costs but preserve liveness. In this vari-
ant, the contract stores the shares and proofs but doesn’t
perform any verification itself. Instead, participants perform
the verification themselves off-chain, and then cast a vote
to indicate their support accordingly (Step 8b). The contract
accepts encrypted and committed share once more than n/2
participants have voted that the proof is correct.
The Scrape contract transitions to the recovery phase
after tcom, and is responsible for transitioning all dealer
contracts that completed the distribution phase to the re-
covery phase (Step 9). Caucus forfeits the deposit of any
dealers that failed to finish the distribution phase. In this
next phase, more than n/2 participants must publish their
decrypted share and a DLEQ that it corresponds to the
encrypted version in the respective Dealer contract. In our
on-chain variant, the Dealer contract verifies the DLEQ
before storing the decrypted share (Step 10a). In our voting
variant, the contract stores it regardless and then waits for
an appropriate number of positive votes about its validity
(Step 10b). Once a sufficient number of shares (and votes, if
applicable) are available, the contract combines the shares to
compute the dealer’s secret (Step 11). The Scrape contract
then combines all dealer secrets to compute the final beacon
Rrnd and transitions Caucus to the election phase (Step 12).
Caucus forfeits the deposits of any participants that did not
publish their decrypted share before tsrc.
At each round during the election phase, participants
can run Reveal to send a value hrnd to the contract. The
contract runs Verify to check that the participant has indeed
won the election before computing the next beacon value
Rrnd+1 ← Rrnd⊕hrnd and starting the next round (Step 13).
If there is no winner after tcaucus, then the next value is
computed as Rrnd+1 ← H(Rrnd).
6.2. Gas costs for cryptographic operations
All cryptographic operations are implemented over the
secp256k1 curve in Solidity. The creation code for the
DLEQ proofs needed for SCRAPE is distributed using the
optional LocalCrypto contract and the DLEQ verifica-
tion code is distributed in the Dealer contract. We briefly
explore the number of multiplications and additions required
for verifying the correct execution of the protocol (on-chain
verification) before highlighting the gas that can be saved
using the voting approach (off-chain verification).
We focus on the gas costs for on-chain verification in
both the distribution and recovery phases (Steps 8a and 10b
respectively), in which participants send the contract DLEQ
proofs. Each DLEQ proof involves 4 MUL and 2 ADD
operations which is approximately 1.5-1.4M (million) gas.
Validating the k committed shares published by the Dealer
in Step 8a requires k MUL and k − 1 ADD operations
which is approximately 2.1M gas when k = 6 and the gas
cost increases linearly for each additional committed share.
Finally, combining all decrypted shares in Step 11 involves
k MUL and k− 1 ADD operations which is approximately
550k gas when k = 7.
We focus on the gas costs for participants casting votes
on whether the proofs are correct in both the distribution
and recovery phases (Steps 7 and 9 respectively). This
requires n2 − n transactions, since n is the number of
Dealer contracts and n− 1 is the number of participants
in each contract. A single vote to confirm that all encrypted
and committed shares distributed by the dealer are well
formed requires approximately 42k gas. On the other hand, a
participant (and the respective dealer) must vote on whether
or not decrypted shares distributed by other participants are
well formed. A single vote on all 6 decrypted shares requires
approximately 400k gas. Although the voting approach in-
volves an additional 76 transactions overall, it also requires
104M less gas.
6.3. Financial costs
Table 1 presents the estimated financial costs for setting
up and running Caucus on the Ethereum network, both
in terms of the gas costs associated with each individual
step described in Section 6.1, as well as the aggregate
costs for each phase of the protocol. The conversions used
were taken as their real-world values in December 2017
(ethgasstation.info).
The total cost for creating all contracts is $54.8 in the
on-chain variant and $52.1 in the voting-based variant. This
cost is incurred only once, as the contract can be stored once
in the blockchain and DELEGATECALL can re-use this code
to create a new instance of each contract.
The total cost for executing the SCRAPE protocol is
$271 in the on-chain variant and $79.8 in the voting-based
variant. After this initial round, the total cost for running
a single round of Caucus is then $0.10, if the contract
must perform only a single hash to verify hrnd against the
committed head of the hash chain; i.e., if rndmax− rnd = 1.
The cost for each additional hash is 128 gas, which is
roughly $0.0001.
Overall, the initial cost to deploy Caucus’s initial con-
tracts is around $50. If a secure random beacon is required
from the very start, then the cost can be kept under $80
using the voting-based approach. On the other hand, if a
secure random beacon is not required immediately (i.e. the
beacon is used to bootstrap a proof of stake protocol as we
describe in Section 7.2), then it is possible to avoid SCRAPE
altogether. However, relying solely on Caucus assumes that
at least one honest participant has contributed to the beacon
before bootstrapping begins. Either way, the cost to continue
the random beacon and thus elect new leaders is only $0.10.
7. Improvements and Extensions
In this section we discuss how the basic Caucus protocol
presented in Section 5 can be changed to detect misbehaving
participants, and how it can be integrated with existing
blockchains based on proof-of-work (PoW) to enable proof-
of-stake (PoS).
7.1. Detecting bias
In our current protocol specification, the winner of a
leader election could potentially bias the beacon by simply
not revealing the value hrnd. If the contract were updated
to store a list of the recent values produced by the random
beacon and participants were required to periodically reveal
a list of pre-images, then the protocol could retroactively
detect this behavior. In particular, it could check for each
beacon value Rk and for all participants i with value h
(i)
k
at the appropriate round whether or not H(h
(i)
k ⊕ Rk) <
targetk, and also whether or not the participant submitted
h
(i)
k . If the inequality holds but the value was not submitted,
then the contract can punish the participant appropriately by,
for example, taking their security deposit.
7.2. Bootstrapping PoS from PoW
The Ethereum Foundation plan to switch Ethereum’s
consensus protocol from proof of work to proof of stake
[35], which motivates the need for a protocol that can
facilitate this transition. Our implementation demonstrates
that Caucus can be set up as a smart contract to satisfy
this transition at a reasonable cost, and because it facilitates
an open-membership policy that allows anyone to register
and participate in leader elections. A proof-of-stake protocol
could then take over as the new consensus protocol after
numerous leader elections in Caucus, which would also
increase the possibility that a single honest participant had
contributed to the random beacon (and thus meaning we
could avoid the expensive step of initializing it using a coin-
tossing protocol).
The missing part of Caucus in order to present a full
PoS protocol is a reward and punishment scheme that solves
the nothing-at-stake and long-range attacks described in
Section 3.4.1. We have intentionally left this problem for
future work to instead focus on rigorously analyzing our
leader election protocol.
8. Conclusion and Open Problems
In this paper, we presented Caucus, a leader election
protocol that, among other potential applications, could be
used to bootstrap a PoW-based blockchain to a PoS-based
one. To analyze Caucus, we presented cryptographic notions
of security specific to the setting of blockchains; namely,
unpredictability, fairness and liveness. We then proved that
Caucus satisfies strong variants of these security properties,
Step Purpose On-chain protocol Voting protocol
Cost (gas) Cost ($) # txns Cost (gas) Cost ($) # txns
Unit costs
1 Create Caucus 6,605,787 12.3 1 5,879,425 10.9 1
2 Create Scrape 4,271,053 7.94 1 3,562,713 6.63 1
3 Register a participant 167,374 0.31 7 167,374 0.31 7
4 Create Dealer 2,652,412 4.93 7 2,652,412 4.93 7
5 Set participants in all Dealer 22,613 0.04 1 29,928 0.06 1
6 Transition Dealer to distribution stage 87,375 0.16 7 87,245 0.16 7
7 Process encrypted shares in Dealer 1,557,849 2.90 42 255,271 0.47 42
8a Validate committed shares for a dealer 2,166,942 4.03 7 — — —
8b Process votes on encrypted shares — — — 42,671 0.08 42
9 Transition Scrape to recovery stage 53,269 0.10 1 61,063 0.11 1
10a Process decrypted shares in Dealer 1,413,342 2.63 42 187,640 0.35 42
10b Process votes on decrypted shares — — — 399,127 0.74 42
11 Join all decrypted shares in a dealer’s contract 552,034 1.03 7 552,034 1.03 7
12 Transition Caucus to election stage 49,267 0.09 1 27,202 0.05 1
13 Elect a leader (per round) 53,651 0.10 1 53,651 0.10 1
Aggregate costs
Create all contracts 29,443,724 54.8 10 28,009,022 52.1 10
Initialize beacon 145,731,246 271.0 115 42,922,542 79.8 192
Elect a leader (per round) 53,651 0.10 1 53,651 0.10 1
Total costs 175,228,621 325.9 126 70,985,215 132.0 202
TABLE 1. BREAKDOWN OF THE GAS COSTS FOR CAUCUS LEADER ELECTION WITH 7 PARTICIPANTS, FOR BOTH THE ON-CHAIN AND VOTING-BASED
VARIANTS. THE COSTS IN USD ($) WERE COMPUTED USING A CONVERSION RATE OF 1 ETHER = $465 AND 1 GAS = 4 GWEI.
while requiring only minimal coordination between the par-
ticipants. While other papers try to solve the proof-of-stake
problem all at once, we instead focused on the security
properties of the leader election, which is a well studied
problem in the distributed system literature but one that
needs a different formalization in the context of blockchains.
More generally, it is difficult to compare the different PoS
protocols that have been proposed, and we believe our model
makes steps towards providing a formal model that allows
for meaningful comparisons.
Due to our focus on leader election, we leave as a future
work an economic incentivization scheme that would be
needed to provide a full solution to the PoS problem, as
proof-of-stake problem consists mostly of a secure leader
election combined with an incentive-compatible reward and
punishment scheme.
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Appendix
The SCRAPE protocol [11] instantiates a publicly verifi-
able secret sharing (PVSS) scheme in order to achieve a pub-
licly verifiable random beacon. As discussed in Section 5,
we have decided to incorporate SCRAPE into Caucus due
to its low computational complexity and its compatibility
with public ledgers.
Briefly, a (n, t)-threshold secret sharing scheme [33]
consists of a set of n participants (P1, . . . , Pn) and a dealer
D who distributes shares (s1, . . . , sn) of a secret s among
the participants in such a way that t or more of them can
recover the secret s. A publicly verifiable secret sharing
(PVSS) scheme [13], [32] has the additional property that
anyone can verify that the shares have been computed
correctly and allow the participants to recover a valid secret.
This means that PVSS schemes consist of a distribution
phase (in which encrypted shares are distributed and their
correctness can be publicly verified) and a recovery phase (in
which encrypted shares are decrypted and revealed, and can
be recovered in the event that some of the initial participants
have gone offline).
1. The original SCRAPE protocol
Briefly, the original SCRAPE protocol proceeds as fol-
lows: the parameters consist of generators g and h of a group
G of prime order q, as well as a hash functionH(·) modeled
as a random oracle. C is also defined to be the linear error
correcting code corresponding to the (n, t)-threshold Shamir
secret sharing scheme, and let C⊥ be its dual code.
To register, each participant Pi generates a secret key
ski
$
←− Fq and a public key pki ← h
ski , and publishes pki
to the ledger.
In the distribution phase, the dealer D picks a secret s
and computes the shares (s1, . . . , sn) of the secret, where
n is the number of registered participants. Then, each
dealer Di publishes a list of encrypted shares (sˆ1, . . . , sˆn),
where sˆi = pk
si
i , a list of committed shares (v1, . . . , vn),
where vi = h
si , and a list of discrete log equality proofs
DLEQ(g, vi, pki, sˆi) that each pair of encrypted and com-
mitted shares correspond to the same discrete log. To verify
these values, anyone can verify the list of DLEQ proofs
before sampling random codewords c⊥ = (c⊥1 , ..., c
⊥
n ) of the
dual code C⊥, corresponding to the instance of Shamir’s
(n, t)-threshold secret sharing used by D, and verify that∏n
i=1 v
c⊥
i
i = 1.
In the recovery phase, each participant decrypts their
share as s˜i = sˆ
1/ski
i and publishes a new proof
DLEQ(h, pki, h
si , sˆi) that the decrypted share corresponds
to the encrypted share. These proofs can again be verified by
anyone. Finally, the dealer’s secret S can be recovered once
half the shares are decrypted using Lagrange interpolation
(where λi =
∏
i6=j
j
j−i are the Lagrange coefficients); i.e.,
by computing
n∏
Pi∈Q
(s˜i)
λi =
n∏
Pi∈Q
hp(i) = hs.
More details and a proof of security (assuming DDH
and modeling H(·) as a random oracle) can be found in the
original SCRAPE paper [11].
2. Our modified protocol
To make the abstract SCRAPE protocol compatible with
our Ethereum-based implementation required several modi-
fications that we highlight here.
First, as discussed in Section 6.1, we included an addi-
tional timer tcom that allows the contract to dictate the end
of the distribution phase, whereas in the original SCRAPE
protocol the recovery phase is said to start after n/2 dealers
have finished the distribution stage. This was done in order
to provide a grace period for all dealers to publish their
commitment before transitioning to the recovery stage. We
still require that t = n/2.
Second, the original SCRAPE protocol proposes as an
optimization that the dealer could send an additional com-
mitment to the full secret S in the distribution phase, and
then open it in the recovery phase; this would mean the
other participants wouldn’t have to recover it. There is no
proposed method in the paper, however, for the dealer to
prove that this additional commitment is the same secret
that would ultimately be derived from the decrypted shares.
Without such a proof, the dealer could commit to a second
secret S′ and then choose to either allow the participants to
recover S or to reveal S′; this would in turn allow it to bias
the beacon. To avoid this type of behavior, we chose not to
include this optimization.
Third, the original SCRAPE protocol suggests picking
a random codeword in order to perform verification. In
our fully on-chain variant, verification is performed by the
contract, which has no source of randomness on which to
draw. Instead then, it uses as a random seed the hash of the
most recent block to do this sampling.
Finally, all DLEQ proofs in SCRAPE rely on a single
challenge e, which is the hash of all commitments, cipher-
texts, and other random factors. It is not feasible to include
all this information in a single transaction as a Solidity
function can only support 16 local variables (including its
parameters). Instead, the dealer sends one proof per trans-
action, along with the value e that the dealer has computed
locally. The contract can verify the proof using the dealer’s
supplied e before storing the committed and encrypted share.
This is necessary to allow the contract to perform both
the verification and storage in a single transaction. After
verifying all proofs, the contract can re-compute e′ using
the stored committed/encrypted shares before proceeding to
the reveal phase if e = e′. Otherwise, it halts in a failed
state.
